

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

----- 061598

P 211826Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1140

INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SANTIAGO 7124

EXDIS

BRASILIA FOR S/P GROUP

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CI, US

SUBJECT: POLICY PLANNING TALKS IN SANTIAGO

1. SUMMARY: EMBASSY BELIEVES NOV 18-19 TALKS BETWEEN US POLICY PLANNERS AND SENIOR CHILEAN OFFICIALS DID MUCH TO CLARIFY UNDERSTANDING OF RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AND REASONS THEREFOR. CHILEANS SHOWED GREATEST CONCERN ABOUT WHAT THEY REGARD AS PERVASIVE SOVIET-CUBAN CAMPAIGN TO DESTROY GOC BY FOMENTING INTERNAL SUBVERSION SUSTAINED FROM OUTSIDE, AND BY EXTERNAL ATTACK BY PERU. THEY WERE ONLY PARTLY REASSURED BY GENERAL EXPRESSION OF USG DESIRE TO ASSIT AND COOPERATE WITH GOC, AND BY US GROUP'S QUALIFIED ANTICIPATION OF FAVORABLE DECISION ON LIMITED SUPPLY OF DEFENSIVE WEAPONS IN NEAR FUTURE. US PLANNERS COGENTLY LAID OUT MAIN LINES OF US DETENTE POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR US FRIENDS SUCH AS CHILE, BUT BY END OF FRANK EXCHANGES IT WAS CLEAR CHILEANS WERE DISAPPOINTED AT LACK OF ALL-OUT US SUPPORT THEY THINK US SHOULD EXTEND IN VIEW ITS POSITION AS THE LEADING ANTI-COMMUNIST POWER. POST BELIEVES MORE REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF EACH PARTY'S THINKING BY THE OTHER LAYS FOUNDATION FOR SOUNDER RELATIONS AND BETTER COOPERATION IN COPING WITH DAY-TO-DAY PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

2. GOC SHOWED EXTRAORDINARY INTEREST IN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

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TWO FULL DAYS OF MEETINGS (SUPPLEMENTED BY WELL ATTENDED

WORKING SOCIAL EVENTS) WERE CHAIRED BY FONMIN ADMIRAL CARVAJAL. THREE SERVICE CHIEFS OF STAFF AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF NATIONAL DEFENSE STAFF ATTENDED ALL SESSIONS, AND MIN ECONOMIC COORDINATION SAEZ, MIN ECONOMY LENIZ, AND MIN FINANCE CAUAS FOR MOST OF TIME. ALL WERE CAREFULLY PREPARED FOR DISCUSSION.

3. CHIEF OF STATE GENERAL PINOCHET RECEIVED US GROUP IN HIS OFFICE FEW MINUTES BEFORE FORMAL SESSIONS BEGAN. HE SET TONE OF FRANKNESS BY REMARKING CHILE IS BETTER FRIEND OF UNITED STATES THAN US IS OF CHILE, AND BY REFERRING POINTEDLY TO GOC REQUESTS TO BUY US ARMS, SOME OUTSTANDING FOR OVER TWO YEARS. LEWIS REPLIED WITH ASSURANCE OF GENERAL SUPPORT AND DESIRE FOR FULLEST EXCHANGE OF LONG-RANGE AND CURRENT PROBLEMS.

4. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, DISCUSSIONS COVERED VERY WIDE RANGE OF PROBLEMS, FIRST IN SET-PIECE PRESENTATIONS AND LATER IN EXTEMPORANEOUS EXCHANGES ON SPECIFIC POINTS, SOMETIMES EXTREMELY FRANK. WE CONSIDER MAIN POINTS EMERGING FROM CHILEAN PRESENTATION TO BE AS FOLLOWS:

5. FIRST, THERE IS NO MISTAKING THEIR FUNDAMENTAL SENSE OF INSECURITY AND ISOLATION. CHILEANS FEEL KEENLY THAT THEY HAVE VERY FEW FOREIGN FRIENDS ON WHOM THEY CAN RELY, OR ON WHOM THEY CAN COUNT FOR ARMS, ECONOMIC OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.

6. SECOND, THEY HAVE A RIGID, UNSHAKEABLE CONVICTION THAT THEY ARE SAVING CHILE (WHICH THEY EQUATE WITH THE PRESENT REGIME) FROM DESTRUCTION BY HOLDING THE LINE AGAINST A HOSTILE COMMUNIST OR MARXIST-LENINIST CONSPIRACY, ORGANIZED BOTH INSIDE THE COUNTRY AND OUTSIDE IT. THEY ARE VASTLY CONCERNED BY DOMESTIC TERRORISM, OF WHICH THEY PRESENT SOLID EVIDENCE, AND FULLY APPRECIATE FORCES RANGED AGAINST THEM IN INDUSTRIAL AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AND IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS -- AS THEY PUT IT, IN THE WITTING OR UNWITTING SERVICE OF COMMUNIST PURPOSES.

7. THIRD, CHILEANS HAVE A VERY DEEP FEAR OF AGGRESSION FROM PERU, STIMULATED IMMEDIATELY BY THE CURRENT IMBALANCE IN MILITARY STRENGTH BUT MORE FUNDAMENTALLY AS THEY SEE IT BY

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SOVIET-CUBAN MANIPULATION OF PERU. CHILEANS FEAR COMMUNISTS ARE BACKING PERU NOT FOR LATTER'S PURPOSE OF REGAINING LOST TERRITORY, BUT IN ORDER TO RE-IMPLANT MARXISM IN CHILE.

8. FOURTH, THE CHILEANS EXHIBIT A SOBER DETERMINATION TO OVERCOME FORMIDABLE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, WHICH ARE LIKELY TO PERSIST FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. THEY WOULD LIKE OUR CONTINUING HELP IN LONG-TERM

DEBT RESCHEDULING NEGOTIATIONS; THEY KNOW THEY NEED IT IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR PETROLEUM IMPORT PROBLEM; THEY TELL US THEY DO NOT WISH THE STEPS THEY NEED TO TAKE TO STABILIZE COPPER PRICES TO INJUR CONSUMERS; THEY HOPE WE WILL ASSIST IN DEVELOPING NEW ENERGY SOURCES, INCLUDING OIL DEPOSITS AND NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR.

9. FURTHER, THE CHILEANS APPEAR UNABLE TO COMPREHEND OR EXPLAIN INTERNATIONAL FUROR OVER THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES EXCEPT IN TERMS OF COMMUNIST COUNTERATTACK. THEY COMPLAIN CONVINCINGLY OF DOUBLE STANDARD FROM WHICH THEY SUFFER, BUT MISS MAIN POINT OF CRITICISM REGARDING LACK OF LEGAL RESTRAINTS AND SAFEGUARDS UNDER THEIR MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM, JUSTIFYING GOC ACTIONS LARGEMLY IN TERMS OF IMMEDIATE INTERNAL SECURITY NEEDS.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
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P 211826Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1141

INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 SANTIAGO 7124

EXDIS

10. CHILEANS RESOLUTELY REFUSED TO RESPOND TO NUMBER OF OPPORTUNITIES PURPOSELY AFFORDED THEM TO DISCUSS NEW DIALOGUE, FUTURE OF OAS, AND SIMILAR MULTILATERAL HEMISPHERIC SUBJECTS. APPARENTLY THEY SEE LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING MUCH THAT WILL BE USEFUL TO THEM IN THIS AREA.

11. FINALLY, INTERESTING SIDELIGHTS APPEARED REGARDING MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS INSIDE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. ECONOMIC TEAM COMPOSED OF ABLE CIVILIAN MINISTERS WAS PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM THE OTHER, EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY, MEMBERS OF CHILEAN GROUP, AND APPEARED TO REGARD MEETINGS AS UNUSUAL OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE TO THEIR MILITARY

COLLEAGUES THEIR IDENTITY OF VIEW AND PURPOSE WITH THE MILITARY.

12. US SPOKESMEN PRESENTED THOROUGH EXPLANATION OF DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTER OF OUR DETENTE POLICIES, STRESSING THAT THESE WERE NOT PURSUED AT THE COST OF OUR ALLIES OR OTHER NATIONS. POINT WAS MADE THAT CONTINUING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT WAS ESSENTIAL IF FOREIGN POLICY CONSENSUS IN US WAS TO BE REBUILT, AND THAT FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT OF TRULY COLLABORATIVE ACTION AMONG KEY NATIONS TO DEAL WITH EMERGING WORLD PROBLEMS SUCH AS FOOD AND ENERGY WOULD HAVE GREAT BEARING ON OUTCOME. US GROUP EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR REQUIREMENTS OF CHILEAN DEFENSE VIS-A-VIS PERU AND INDICATED HOPE THAT TOW AND OTHER EQUIPMENT MIGHT SOON BE PROVIDED TO MEET CHILE'S MOST PRESSING NEED FOR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. CAUTIONED

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CHILEANS AGAINST PROVOCATION, AND POINTED OUT PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF COUNTRIES CONCERNED TO GRAPPLE WITH THEIR MUTUAL PROBLEMS IN CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. US WOULD DO EVERYTHING IT COULD THROUGH INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM TO HELP AVOID CONFLICT AND PRESERVE HEMISPHERE SECURITY. WE HAD TO ADMIT TO SOME DISAGREEMENT RE CHILEAN EVALUATION OF SOVIET ROLE IN THIS PART OF WORLD, CONSIDERING SOVIETS MORE CAUTIOUS AND LESS FAR REACHING IN THEIR ACTIONS THAN CHILEANS ALLEGE; WE WERE INCLINED TO GIVE MORE CREDIT TO CHILEAN STATEMENTS RE CUBA'S ANTI-CHILEAN ACTIVITIES.

14. COMMENT: IN EMBASSY'S VIEW, THESE PLANNING CONSULTATIONS WERE EXTREMELY USEFUL, PRECISELY BECAUSE THROGH THEIR FRANKNESS AND DIRECTNESS THEY DISCLOSED IN RATHER GLARING FASHION DIFFERENCES AS WELL AS SIMILARITIES OF VIEW. WE BELIEVE TALKS HAVE CONVINCED CHILEANS THAT US AND CHILEANS INTERESTS DO NOT FULLY COINCIDE, AND THAT THE US VIEWPOINT IS THOROUGHLY REASONED AND PROBABLY NOT SUBJECT TO MAJOR CHANGE AS RESULT OF VICISSITUDES SUFFERED BY CHILE. NEVERTHELESS, TALKS SHOULD AT SAME TIME HAVE LEFT IMPRESSION THAT WITHIN BROAD LIMITS THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR FRUITFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, SUBJECT TO OBVIOUS LIMITATIONS. IN A NUTSHELL, AMERICANS WERE DISCUSSING EXTENT OF CHILEAN-US COOPERATION, WHEREAS WHAT CHILEANS WOULD LIKE IS COORDINATION BETWEEN US ON A COMMON LINE OF (ANTI-COMMUNIST) POLICY. WE BELIEVE CLEARER RECOGNITION OF OUR DIFFERENCES SHOULD PROVIDE A BETTER BASIS FOR WORKING AWAY AT OUR DAILY GRIST OF PROBLEMS.

15. CHILEANS ARE DEEPLY DUG IN BOTH IN THEIR COLD-WAR APPROACH TO THEIR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PROBLEMS AND IN THEIR ESTIMATES REGARDING PERU-CHILE SITUATION. WE THINK THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THEY FAILED TO CONVINCE US SIDE OF UNDERLYING

SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERUVIAN THREAT; ON OUR SIDE, WE  
FOUND CHILEANS POORLY INFORMED AS TO FACTS RE PERU AND PRONE  
TO REACH THEIR CONCLUSIONS AS TO THREAT ON INSUFFICIENT  
EVIDENCE. EMBASSY HOPES TO PURSUE EACH OF THE MANY POINTS  
RAISED IN THE TALKS AS THE OCCASION ARISES, IN HOPE THAT,  
OVER TIME, AT LEAST SOME OF OUR DIFFERENCES MAY BE NARROWED.

16. THIS MESSAGE NOT SEEN BY S/P GROUP; PREPARED AFTER ITS

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DEPARTURE AND SENT AT ITS SUGGESTION.

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## Message Attributes

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